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A B S T R A C T
An analysis of electricity systems in Germany, California and Wisconsin ﬁnds that balanced portfolios
made up of zero- and low-carbon baseload resources, as well as wind and solar, are the most cost-
effective means of producing electricity and reducing carbon.
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The electric utility industry is in the midst of a multi-decadal
transformation, driven by growing market competition, increas-
ingly stringent environmental regulations, and signiﬁcant techno-
logical innovation. Unchanged by this transformation is the fact
that electricity remains a necessity of modern industrialized life,
indispensable to virtually every home and business. In the United
States, electricity is inexpensive, invisible, and remarkably reli-
able—qualities which encourage consumers to take it for granted.
Beginning with the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978
(PURPA) and continuing to the present, electric utilities (which had
traditionally been vertically integrated and rate-regulated) have
been subjected to increasing competition. The Clean Air Act of
1970, and particularly its 1990 Amendments, initiated a series of
increasingly stringent air quality regulations. The U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency’s Clean Power Plan, aimed at limiting
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from power plants, will bring new
pressures on the industry. Technological innovation is a third
driver of transformation. Encouraged, in part, by evolving industry
structure and new environmental laws, often supported by state
and federal subsidies and mandates, new technologies now
compete with traditional power plants and wires to serve the
once-captive utility customer.
In recent years, these separate transformative forces have
coincided under the rubric of climate change. Driven by growing
scientiﬁc alarm and political mobilization, the pressure to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) from the utility sector is intense* Corresponding author.
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third of U.S. GHGs, are the focus of unprecedented political and
regulatory scrutiny.
Due to the inability of Congress to agree upon climate
legislation, climate policy has been pursued by proxy in diverse,
fragmented measures such as subsidies and mandates for speciﬁc
technologies, creating a patchwork of politically preferred energy
policies rather than a system-based, comprehensive approach to
achieving long-term emission reductions. Partly because of that
dynamic, the debate over how to reduce GHGs from the utility
sector has become a drama of confused ends and means, where
political and intellectual support for solar and wind power have
distracted policymakers’ attention from the larger goal of cost-
effective decarbonization.
A prime exampleof thisconfusionisabodyofstudies arguing that
the GHG reduction burden can be met solely or mainly by renewable
energy alone (Jacobson and Delucci, 2009; Kombikraftwerk2;
Chandler et al., 2014). In seeking to demonstrate that renewables
can by themselves replace all fossil fuels and nuclear energy, these
studies run the risk of treating renewables as a societal end in itself,
instead of just one among a suite of technologies that could be used
to achieve the combined goals of environmental protection, cost-
containment, and electric system reliability.
In most of these studies, wind and solar power (mostly solar
photovoltaic, or PV) dominate the resource mix in the future. So it
is important to ask: What do systems that are highly reliant on
intermittent renewable resources (IR), such as wind and solar, look
like? How do they compare to other possible system conﬁgurations
in terms of cost, size, and carbon emissions?
We report here on the results of three studies we have done that
examine these questions. We will highlight our most important
ﬁndings and then discuss their policy implications.der the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Table 1
System size under multiple scenarios for California, Germany, and Wisconsin.
Conﬁguration Total size (MW) NGCC Wind Solar Nuclear
CA default 53,633
CA 50 RPS 90,534 39,433 19,449 23,609 0
CA 80 RPS 123,589 38,926 34,614 42,017 0
CA balanced 63,662 22,925 6868 8337 17,500
CA 195 RPS 251,734 36,923 93,400 113,379
WI default 811
WI 50 RPS 1799 765 324 710 0
WI 80 RPS 2383 756 540 1087 0
WI balanced 1265 508 162 355 240
WI 172 RPS 4383 727 1026 2630
Germany default 67,028
Germany 50 RPS 150,111 56,030 45,038 41,531 0
Germany 80 RPS 233,185 55,721 88,274 81,401 0
Germany balanced 79,859 34,556 9308 8583 20,000
Germany 154 RPS 437,600 54,956 195,163 179,969
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We undertook these studies to better understand and illustrate
the system consequences of high penetrations of intermittent
renewables (IR)—primarily wind and solar PV—and to compare
such systems to potential decarbonization pathways that include
low-carbon baseload generation technologies (i.e., nuclear and
fossil fuels with carbon capture and sequestration), along with
more modest (25%) contributions from wind and solar. We refer to
these mixed scenarios as balanced strategies. These studies
focused on three widely varying geographies: Germany, California,
and Wisconsin. We used historical wind and solar production
patterns as the basis for the analysis; these patterns were used to
estimate the hourly contributions from wind and PV sufﬁcient to
satisfy renewable portfolio standards (RPS) of 50 and 80%, we then
calculated residual hourly non-renewable generation required for
each hour of the year. We also developed estimates for IR systems
that performed equivalently in terms of CO2 reductions to the
balanced scenarios; these are labeled CA 195, WI 172 and Germany
154, respectively.
Germany’s energy transition policy, the Energiewende, aspires
to provide 80% of Germany’s electricity from renewable sources by
2050 while retiring the German nuclear ﬂeet and implementing an
ambitious energy efﬁciency effort. These policies have stimulated a
rapid increase in the use of both wind and solar PV. As of the end of
2014, Germany had installed about 35 GW each of wind and PV;
renewable electricity (including hydro and biomass) accounted for
about 28% of total supply. The rate of new capacity addition has
slowed dramatically in the past three years as the country has
struggled with rapidly rising electricity prices.
California is on track to meet a 33% RPS by 2020; the legislature
has approved a proposal to increase the RPS to 50%, and there is
support in the state for raising the RPS to 80%.
Wisconsin currently has a modest 10% RPS. A recent study by
the Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts and Letters has
stimulated calls for increasing the standard, with some organiza-
tions advocating a 60% RPS.
These three areas have widely varying geographies, and
signiﬁcantly different energy systems today, providing the
opportunity to explore the implications of renewables policies
in different contexts. For each of these areas, we compared RPSs of
50% and 80% to a balanced portfolio of low-carbon energy sources
including nuclear and a 25% IR contribution. For each scenario, we
calculated cost ($/MWH), system size (MW) and carbon perfor-
mance (tons CO2 and $ per ton of CO2 reduced).
We relied on data from the U.S. Energy Information Adminis-
tration (USEIA) (2015) Annual Energy Outlook for generating
technology costs for these studies (USEIA, 2015). To test the outer
bounds of these scenarios, we conducted sensitivity analyses that
assumed rapid and signiﬁcant cost declines for wind and solar
(capital costs of $1000/kW, compared to projected EIA costs of
$1850 for wind and $3123 for solar PV) as well as increased costs
for nuclear ($6500/kW capital costs, as opposed to EIA assump-
tions of $4646). These scenarios are designated below as OR/PN
(optimistic renewables/pessimistic nuclear).
3. Key ﬁndings
 IR-heavy systems are signiﬁcantly larger than conventional
counterparts; this is because intermittent resources like wind
and PV have low capacity factors; to generate the same amount
of output, a larger system is needed.
 Using EIA assumptions for technology costs, IR-heavy systems
are more expensive on a dollars-per-megawatt-hour basis.
 Combining optimistic assumptions about renewable costs with
pessimistic assumptions about nuclear costs produces resultsindicating balanced systems would be more expensive in
Wisconsin and California, but still cheaper in Germany.
 Under ordinary cost assumptions, 80% RPS scenarios yield about
a 70% reduction in CO2 emissions; balanced generation systems
produce reductions between 80 and 87%.
 To achieve CO2 reductions on par with balanced portfolios, IR
systems must be built much larger, to between 154 and 195% RPS
levels.
 Wind and solar output exhibit seasonal episodes of both
sustained oversupply and undersupply that overwhelm any
conceivable storage strategy. Battery storage technologies may
have a role in managing shorter-term imbalances but are
unlikely to solve the very large seasonal swings in generation
output under high-penetration IR scenarios. Pumped hydroelec-
tric storage (PSH) is the only available technology applicable to
longer-term storage; however, storing the large seasonal
surpluses produced in these scenarios would require much
more PSH than could be reasonably installed. While some long-
term storage may be feasible, wasted surplus is unavoidable in
high-IR systems, and backup conventional generation remains
necessary.
4. Discussion
4.1. IR systems are larger
Modern wind plants produce power at capacity factors (CF)
between 30 and 40%; solar PV system CF ranges between 10% and
25%. To produce the same energy output (in kilowatt-hours, or
kWh) as conventional power plants (with CFs ranging from 80 to
90%), more wind and solar capacity will have to be built. In
addition, as Table 1 shows, even with very high levels of wind and
solar, considerable conventional capacity (here designated as
NGCC-natural gas combined cycle) must be retained to ensure
continuity of supply when it is calm or cloudy. In these analyses,
the default scenario represents a system unconstrained by CO2
limitations and without binding requirements for renewables. The
default system is composed entirely of natural gas combined cycle
units.
Under 50% RPS scenarios, more than 40% of the installed
capacity remains gas-powered; under 80% RPS scenarios, the NGCC
component of the system remains almost as large, only supple-
mented with much larger renewables systems that produce
smaller emissions reductions. This data suggests that building
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conventional generation capacity.
Why must generation systems retain so much conventional
generation even when large amounts of renewables are added to
the system?
Intermittence means that wind and solar PV do not contribute
to the system capacity needs in the same fashion as conventional
plants. Capacity is a reﬂection of the ability to meet the
instantaneous demand on the electric grid at any time. Most
utility systems are engineered to meet projected peak demand,
plus reserves to account for outages of various sorts. (An exception
is hydro-heavy systems, where planning for total annual energy is
the bigger challenge.)
The probability that a conventional plant will not be available
when needed is represented statistically by its forced outage rate.
Modern thermal plants can reliably deliver their full output (if
needed) 90–95% of the time. In contrast, a 100 MW wind farm can
only be relied upon for 10–20 MW of power. For solar, the situation
is more complicated; capacity value can be higher in summer
peaking systems but is usually zero in winter peaking systems,
such as in Germany. Consequently, there is a persistent need for
some kind of backup for most of the wind and solar capacity.
Larger electric systems, with more dispersed generating assets,
will also require more transmission. A major study conducted by
the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) conﬁrms that a
high-IR system will mean dramatic expansion of transmission
infrastructure. Indeed, NREL concluded that transmission building
would need to expand 100-fold over the baseline in order to facility
a national 80% RPS. Virtually all energy infrastructure projects
generate public opposition; systems that are two to three times
larger and that entail more transmission than conventional ones
are certain to be more controversial.
To fully appreciate the reliability challenge associated with high
penetration of variable resources, it is also important to consider
variability across all relevant time periods—hourly, daily, season-
ally, and annually. In Wisconsin, for example, December and












Fig. 1. Month-to-month winIn California, summer is best for both PV and wind, while winter is
poor for both. The challenge is that customer demand must be
served year-round, 24 h per day, regardless of meteorological
conditions. The system must be planned for the worst months, not
the best.
Fig. 1 presents monthly capacity factors for wind in California in
two years, 2009 and 2014. It is clear from this picture that wind
production peaks in the summer months and tapers off during the
spring and fall. It is also apparent that, although the general pattern
of production is similar, the annual variability is not trivial in some
months.
In the northern hemisphere, solar output peaks are highest
during the summer and lowest in the winter. Fig. 2 presents solar
radiation data for four widely separated locations in the United
States; the annual rise and fall in production can be seen for each of
these locations.
4.2. IR systems are costlier
Using current EIA estimates for capital and operating costs, IR-
dominated systems will produce electric rates that are higher than
balanced portfolios. Table 2 shows that, under these assumptions,
the balanced generation portfolio is cheaper than both RPS levels
while delivering higher levels of carbon reduction (see Table 3 for
emissions data). In each scenario, a balanced portfolio (using only
25% IR generation) achieves greater emissions reductions than an
80% RPS at a cost below that of a 50% RPS.
Assertions that wind and solar PV are cost-competitive with
other resources rely using the “levelized cost of electricity” (LCOE)
as the comparative metric, which does not account for the
differences in CF between conventional resources and IR and the
resulting system cost increases that come with greater penetration
of these resources. Indeed, a number of analysts have pointed to
the failing of the LCOE as a meaningful basis for comparison.
As noted, 1 MW of wind or PV is not equivalent to 1 MW of a
dispatchable generation source such as a nuclear plant or NGCC
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Fig. 2. Monthly variation in solar radiation in four US locations.
Table 2
System costs under multiple scenarios for California, Germany, and Wisconsin.
Cost EIA ($/MWH) OR/PN ($/MWH)
CA default 52 52
CA 50 RPS 96 61
CA 80 RPS 140 78
CA balanced 93 98
CA 195 RPS 324 128
WI default 52 52
WI 50 RPS 147 85
WI 80 RPS 202 106
WI balanced 128 112
WI 172 RPS 413 189
Germany default 73 73
Germany 50 RPS 126 83
Germany 80 RPS 194 109
Germany balanced 84 88
Germany 154 RPS 377 190
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pay the full cost of the electric system, and studies that ignore
system costs run the risk of misrepresenting the consequences of
policies that affect system conﬁguration.
Claims that renewables are at “grid parity” obscure signiﬁcant
engineering and economic questions. In the case of PV, grid parity
often means that the cost of solar (minus subsidies) is about equal
to the retail electric rate. Since the retail electric rate represents the
rolled-up costs of generation, transmission, distribution, and
administration, using it as basis for comparing PV to other
generating options is inappropriate and exaggerates the beneﬁts
provided by solar signiﬁcantly. In addition, this measure ignores
the cost to the rest of the system for providing backup to the PV
system. This metric is useful for determining economics for the
potential owner of the PV system, but as an expression of how the
system at large will be affected, it is useless.
For wind, “grid parity” is usually taken to mean that the
generating cost of power from the wind project is at or near other
that of other generation technologies. This metric still fails to
account for the effect of wind’s low CF and the need to maintain
signiﬁcant conventional backup resources for system reliability.
Looking at total system costs, we ﬁnd default costs ranging from
$52 MWh in California and Wisconsin to $73 MWh in Germany.
Cutting CO2 emissions by half via RPSs would double the cost of
electricity in California (raising it to $96 per MWh), and have even
greater effects in Wisconsin ($147 per MWh) and Germany
($126 per MWh). But for roughly comparable costs, a balanced
system of low-carbon sources could reduce emissions by more
than 80%, a far better performance.
Deeper emissions reductions are more expensive—and the cost
and performance penalty for greater reliance on IR generation
grows signiﬁcantly at high levels of system penetration. For an 80%
RPS, the cost of electricity would rise to $140 per MWh in
California, $202 per MWh in Wisconsin, and $194 per MWh in
Germany, a tripling (or more) of electricity costs.
These projections reﬂect the important system conﬁguration
effects that come with a strong reliance on IR generation—but
naturally, core technology costs are also relevant. Recognizing theinherent uncertainties in future technology costs and wanting to
test the outer bounds of our ﬁndings here, we developed a scenario
with optimistic assumptions about cost reductions for renewables
coupled with pessimistic assumptions about rising costs of nuclear
power; data from that scenario are presented in the right-hand
column of Tables 2 and 3.
Even under such favorable assumptions for renewables, an 80%
RPS would be more expensive than a balanced system in Germany
and only slightly cheaper than a balanced system in Wisconsin and
California. However, the balanced portfolio achieves deeper CO2
cuts than the 80% RPS in all cases (as discussed below), which must
be considered as electric systems are designed. When this is taken
into account, balanced systems are cheaper, even with steep cost
declines for wind and solar.
4.3. Balanced systems achieve deeper CO2 reductions
Table 3 shows that balanced systems (nuclear baseload plus
25% wind and solar) do a better job of cutting carbon than high-IR
Table 3
CO2 emissions and costs under multiple scenarios for California, Germany, and Wisconsin.
% CO2 reduction EIA ($/ton CO2 reduced) OR/PN ($/ton CO2 reduced)
CA 50 RPS 50 280 42
CA 80 RPS 70 393 91
CA balanced 87 150 128
CA 195 RPS 87 775 300
WI 50 RPS 48 633 174
WI 80 RPS 67 729 210
WI balanced 81 303 192
WI 172 RPS 81 1168 440
Germany 50 RPS 50 348 103
Germany 80 RPS 69 553 184
Germany balanced 86 207 88
Germany 154 RPS 86 877 335
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range of 70%, while balanced systems produce reductions over
80%; the difference is due to the fact that not all of the IR electricity
can be used, as discussed above. Even assuming the existence of
storage with an 85% round-trip efﬁciency leaves the RPS-80’s CO2
performance short of the balanced portfolio. It is important to
remember that the storage would add signiﬁcant cost to the
equation, which is considered below.
How far would IR have to be pushed to achieve CO2 reductions
comparable to the balanced portfolio? Without storage, the answer
is very far, indeed. The last entry for each jurisdiction in our
analysis shows that, without storage, RPSs of between 154 and
195% would be required to achieve CO2 reductions comparable to
the balanced portfolios. The cost per ton of CO2 removed is
substantially higher than for the balanced scenarios.
In almost every scenario, under a wide range of assumptions
and across three widely varying geographies, cutting CO2
emissions with a balanced portfolio of low-carbon generation
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Fig. 3. Annual surplus generation episoderenewables alone. As Tables 3 and 4 show, a balanced low-carbon
system consistently achieves signiﬁcantly greater emissions
reductions at far less cost.
Decarbonization is not cheap in any of these scenarios, but there
are very large differences in cost for different system conﬁg-
urations. While 80% decarbonization through a balanced system
would nearly double the cost of energy in California and Germany,
and almost triple costs in Wisconsin, the cost per ton is typically
half (or less) than the RPS-driven scenarios, making balanced
systems twice as cost-effective as IR-centric systems.
Even a relatively modest 50% reduction in CO2 emissions relying
on a 50% RPS would be expensive, with a cost-effectiveness ranging
from, at best, $280 per avoided ton of emissions in California down
to $348/ton in Germany and a staggering $633/ton in Wisconsin.
The cost-effectiveness gap is even greater when the desired
emission reductions increase. An 80% RPS (which, as noted above,
only cuts emissions by 70% or less) has a cost-effectiveness ranging
from $393 per ton of avoided emissions in California to $553/ton in
Germany and $729 per ton in Wisconsin.LUS EPISODES
NARIO
s in California under RPS 80 scenario.
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emissions reductions well over 80% at a cost of $150/ton in
California, $207/ton in Germany, and $303 per ton in Wisconsin.
It is worth noting that all of these ﬁgures are greater than most
current estimates of the social cost of carbon, which are typically
around $40/ton.
4.4. Large seasonal imbalances cannot be completely managed by
storage
Storage is frequently seen as the solution to the imbalances
created in high-IR systems; developing cost-effective energy
storage systems is widely thought to be the key to decarbonizing
the electricity grid. Our studies (as well as other literature)
suggests otherwise.
The issue is not merely what might be possible in an
engineering sense but what is economical and socially acceptable.
Adding storage technologies to the grid at large scale will have
signiﬁcant costs, which will grow as IR penetration rises. Even if
innovation reduces the cost of storage, whatever technologies
evolve will still represent an additional cost to the system. The
electricity that is used to charge the storage system is not free, the
act of storage itself produces efﬁciency losses of 10–20%, and
storage systems require signiﬁcant investment. To be economical,
such equipment must be used frequently—yet seasonal intermit-
tency requires storage capacity with a very low utilization rate.
The dynamics of storage are trickier than might ﬁrst appear, due
to both the seasonal variation in surplus production (which is
observed in virtually every location) and the day-to-day variations.
Fig. 3 presents the hourly surpluses generated in the
RPS80 scenario for California for an entire year. It can be clearly
seen that these surpluses are not evenly distributed throughout
the year. The largest surplus episode is about 45,000 MWh; the
average episode, however is about 4100 MWh. Clearly, a system
designed to store 45,000 MWh would be grossly underutilized















Fig. 4. Cumulative annual surplus generatiostandpoint. An ideally sized storage system would not be able to
capture all of the surplus, given the unevenness of its production.
The problem becomes even more daunting when we consider
the cumulative storage required, instead of only the largest
instantaneous need. Fig. 4 shows that for the California 80 RPS
scenario, the balance of stored energy grows by mid-year to
8 million MWh; this means that 8 million MWh of storage would
be required to save and later utilize this electricity. At present costs
of around $500/kWh for battery storage, this would add about
$480 billion per year in annual costs. The total annual costs of the
80% RPS for California without storage are around $30 billion, so
this storage would increase system costs by a factor of 16. Even
with storage costs cut in half, the impact on electric rates of such an
expenditure would be extraordinary.
Total pumped-storage hydroelectric (PHS) capability in Cal-
ifornia is currently less than 150,000 MWh, spread over an
installed capacity of about 5200 MW (Anon., 2016). PHS would
need to be expanded more than 100-fold to accommodate the
surplus projected in our study. Sites for PHS are extremely limited,
and, given environmental concerns over siting, making such a vast
expansion of PHS capacity in California seems quite unlikely.
4.5. What do other studies say?
There is broad agreement between numerous studies on the
ﬁrst core conclusion of our work: energy systems relying heavily on
IR will necessarily be larger than conventional systems. The degree to
which other studies consider and agree upon the implications of
that fact—for cost, and cost-effectiveness as a decarbonization
strategy—vary.
Jacobson et al. (2014) in a simulation of an all-renewable future
for California, project that installed generation capacity would
grow from present levels of around 70 GW to an astounding
621 GW, nearly a nine-fold increase in electricity generation
infrastructure. Conventional electric demand is shrunk substan-
tially in this scenario through ambitious energy efﬁciency efforts,
but then increased to incorporate transportation and industry.LATIVE SURPLUS
T RPS
n in California under RPS 80 scenario.
12 S. Brick, S. Thernstrom / The Electricity Journal 29 (2016) 6–12The World Wildlife Fund conducted a study for China that
reached similar conclusions. To meet 80% of electric supply
renewables, and to serve peak demand of 2000 GW, WWF devised
a 5000 GW system that still retains 1100 GW of conventional NGCC
capacity to balance the wind and PV. A 2400 MW conventional
system could meet that demand reliably.
China’s NDRC (NDRC, 2015) recently released a high-renewable
scenario with similar ﬁndings, except that it retains 800 GW of coal
to balance the system.
It should be noted that the authors of these studies see them as
demonstrating the feasibility of these scenarios, while we ﬁnd the
practical implications of these ﬁgures daunting.
In the United States, the Deep Decarbonization Pathway Project
study (Williams et al., 2015) considered three scenarios: high
renewables, a mix of renewables and conventional, and low-
carbon conventional (i.e., nuclear and fossil fuels with carbon
capture and storage). All three scenarios produce comparable CO2
reductions; the low-carbon conventional pathway is the cheapest
(and smallest) system.
5. Conclusions
The ongoing transformation of the nation’s electric grid is a
matter of great importance to our economy, national security, and
environmental quality. The signiﬁcance of these questions is only
matched by their complexity. Given the competing values affected
by these choices, it is essential that analysis of these questions
compare alternate pathways that could perform well in multiple
dimensions—that is, policies that could most cost-effectively
reduce CO2 emissions signiﬁcantly over time while maintaining
the affordability and reliability of the electric system and
minimizing other environmental harms.
How to best meet those goals despite potential tradeoffs
between their different elements is a complex question that
requires careful analysis—yet for many, the presumptive answer
has been almost self-evident (as suggested by the failure of much
of the literature to compare alternatives): Renewables are the
technology of choice, and the only question considered is how to
deploy them. This is a dangerous confusion of ends and means.
In the studies presented here, we see that the intermittency of
wind and solar PV means that systems that are heavily reliant on
them must be signiﬁcantly larger than conventional systems; this
increases their cost and capital requirements dramatically.
(Although not examined here, wind and solar’s low power density
means these systems also have a vastly larger geographical
footprint.) Increasing reliance on IR generation brings increasing
demands for storage (and/or transmission) technologies to manage
their intermittency; the costs (and land-use effects) are also
signiﬁcant.
Given these facts, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that heavy
use of intermittent renewables may not be the most cost-effective
way to reduce CO2 emissions from the power sector.
Efforts to promote an all- (or nearly all-) renewables future are,
in effect, a commitment to building the largest electric power
system possible. It might be better to start from the presumption
that the smallest power system that meets our needs is likely to be
the most efﬁcient, and have the least social and environmental
impact.
Licensing any new energy infrastructure—whether nuclear
power plants, hydroelectric dams, transmission lines, or industrial-
scale wind farms and PV installations—is almost always difﬁcult;
lawsuits and delays are inevitable, given the effects these projects
have on communities and the environment. Calls for an all-
renewables future are an implicit commitment to a nearly never-
ending political and legal battle over licensing of thisinfrastructure, with potentially signiﬁcant consequences for our
landscape and ecology if renewables developers are successful.
Rather than building a system that is much larger and more
expensive than necessary, we should rigorously seek to ascertain
the most cost-effective way to maintain reliability and cut carbon
emissions.
We should also be wary of efforts to see energy policy choices
through the lens of job creation: rather than seeking an energy
system that employs the most people, we might ﬁnd the greatest
efﬁciency in systems that can be operated and maintained by the
fewest number of employees possible. Electricity, as an input to most
every single good and service in the world, should be as inexpensive
as possible, and not a vehicle for pursuit of tangential social goals.
When considering these policy options, it is essential to look at
systems as systems. Without this, without the ability to compare
and debate multiple pathways for achieving complex, interlinked
goals, we are ﬂying blind—making decisions of enormous social
and economic consequence with partial data. We must be realistic
about the scope and complexity of this transformation, acknowl-
edge that difﬁcult tradeoffs are involved, and ensure all options are
rigorously considered and compared.
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